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Abstract 
We experimentally study decision-making in a novel dynamic coordination 
game. The game captures features of a transition between externality networks. 
Groups consisting of three subjects start in a stable benchmark equilibrium with 
network externality. Over seven rounds, they can transit to an alternative stable 
equilibrium based on the other network. The alternative network has higher 
payoffs, but the transition is slow and costly. Coordination is required to 
implement the transition while minimizing costs.  
In the experiment, the game is repeated five times, which enables groups 
to learn to coordinate over time. We compare a neutral language treatment with a 
‘green framing’ treatment, in which meaningful context is added to the 
instructions. We find the green framing to significantly increase the number of 
profitable transitions, but also to inhibit the learning from past experiences, and 
thus it reduces coherence of strategies. Consequently, payoffs in both treatments 
are similar even though the green framing results in twice as many transitions. 
In the context of environmental policy, the experiment suggests general 
support for ‘going green’, but we also find evidence for anchoring of beliefs by 
green framing; proponents and opponents stick to their initial strategies. 
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The choice for technology standards in software and hardware, and 
membership of social networks are typical examples where individual and social 
benefits of participation in an activity increase with the number of participants. 
Network externalities extend from the local level, e.g. standardization of 
procedures within firms, to the global level, e.g. standardization of recording 
technologies. Recently, a similar argument has developed when considering the 
global development of carbon-free energy sources, as opposed to continued 
dependence on fossil fuels (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Green innovation is believed to 
benefit from a coordinated and coherent transition. There are increasing returns 
to scale as innovation builds on existing knowledge, and infrastructure and energy 
sources develop in tandem. The spillovers suggest the need for a coordinated 
global policy, to transform the world economy from one based on fossil fuel 
energy, to one based on renewables. 
We design a novel dynamic game, which we believe includes some key 
elements of major transition processes. Specifically, our game satisfies Katz and 
Shapiro’s (1986) definition of a network externality that “the utility that a user 
derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents 
consuming the good." The game is a type of dynamic three-player stag-hunt game. 
It combines features of a coordination game, and has a flavor of a public good game 
(such as free-rider incentives). We study how people behave in this game in a 
laboratory experiment. In our experiment, we specifically consider the effect of 
green framing; the game captures elements of a transition to a green economy, 
which we accentuate in one of the treatments. We refer to our game as the ‘green 
transition game’, but the game without framing describes more generally the 
transition in a network economy.  
In the game, which consists of multiple rounds, group members have to 
choose whether they want to transit from the benchmark (initial) state to an 
alternative state, where states in the game are determined by chips that can take 
two different colors. Initially (in the first round), all group members have three 
chips of the same color (purple in the reference treatment, brown in the green 
framing treatment), and the benchmark state is a stable Nash equilibrium. In each 
of the following rounds of the game, individuals can change the color of one of 
their chips, at most one per round, and in both directions. The network externality 
arises as only chips that match the color group majority are paid. If five group 
chips are changed into the other color (blue in the reference treatment, green in 
the framing treatment), the majority has changed, and the stable Nash strategy 
becomes for all members to transit as quickly as possible to the alternative state, 
in which all group members have chips of the same (but other) color. The 
transition is slow, and the payoffs depend on the own choices interacting with the 
choices made by the collective within a group, that is, on the composition of the 
chips in the group at the beginning of a round. The alternative equilibrium, where 
all chips have changed color, has higher payoff. To have a consistent green framing 
treatment, we give chips of the other (non-initial) color (blue or green) a public 
good character. Blue (green) chips yield payoffs not only to the individual who 
owns them, but to all group members. The core features of our game are the 
following. The alternative state (with all blue or green chips) offers a higher 
potential payoff for all group members. The transition from the initial state to the 
alternative state is costly. Costs are so high, that the transition is only profitable 
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when the group transits coherently. For an individual player, choices are risky. 
This simple set up defines a coordination problem: only when the majority of the 
group transit, does it pay off for the individual to go along. The transition dynamics 
produce a ‘valley of death’: during the transition, all players have lower payoffs, 
but frontrunners pay most. If in a game individuals start a transition to the 
alternative state, but find no support by their group members, they suffer 
substantial losses and may rather turn back. Stated reversely, this feature 
resembles a free-rider problem. An individual that lags one round behind the 
other group members during the transition benefits most.1 
As the game is novel it is difficult to predict how individuals behave in the 
experiment. However, under the above conditions, we believed that it is difficult 
for groups to coordinate on a transition, even though groups that succeed have 
significantly higher payoffs. Individuals have to form beliefs about the choices of 
their peer group members, and when too many individuals choose to delay the 
transition for their own gain, the transformation fails and losses cumulate. Most 
costs are allocated to those individuals that supported the transition, while the 
conservative or opportunistic members do not pay the price, or even gain, from 
their lack of support. 
The first aim of this paper is to see what decision subjects make in this game. 
Do they manage to transit or not? To enable groups to learn to coordinate over 
time, the same game was played five times, with constant but anonymous group 
members (partner matching).  
Secondly, we are interested in the effect of framing in this type of dynamic 
coordination games. It has been widely documented that even though the 
information provided and the choices to be made are the same over treatments, 
beliefs and choices are affected by the way the problem is framed (e.g. Dufwenberg 
et al. 2011). In our context, framing can enhance the transition, for example as it 
provides an understanding of a common benefit. But the opposite is also possible, 
as framing anchors beliefs and as such reduces the flexibility of subjects’ 
strategies. We investigate framing effects by adding a treatment in which we add 
meaningful environmental context to the instructions. That is, whereas the 
baseline treatment uses neutral language as much as possible, the framing 
treatment uses language that is environmentally loaded. Apart from the framing 
the two treatments are identical in terms of subjects, experimental procedure, 
payoffs, and all other design issues. In particular, also in the framing treatment the 
same game was repeated five times with partner matching. 
We choose green framing. The global interest in and concerns about climate 
change and media attention provides a meaningful context (IPCC 2014). For some 
experiment subjects, the framing induces support for the transition; they may 
reflect on a better world not addicted to fossil fuel energy. But the framing also 
provides potential anchoring into the present state. Climate sceptics warn for 
huge costs involved when the world economy built on richly available cheap fossil 
fuel energy has to transform into one that drives on – mostly intermittent – 
renewable energy sources. The technology of the game presumes that the 
transition is beneficial, the equivalent of an optimist perspective where green 
growth is feasible – various studies point to economic benefits of a clean 
                                                        
1 As an example, consider the case of climate policy. If the world moves away from fossil-fuels, 
prices will drop, and it becomes increasingly beneficial for individual countries to defect a climate 
treaty and enjoy cheap energy for a little longer. 
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environment – even though the transition towards such an economy where clean 
technologies are favored over dirty technologies will be a costly endeavor 
(Acemoglu et al. 2012), not in the least because of the enormous infrastructural 
investments required to support a renewable energy structure (IEA 2011). 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. The multi-person 
dynamic game we have developed is simple but has interesting features, both from 
a theoretical and an experimental point of view. In addition, we believe that key 
elements of the game, such as the coordination problem, the role of beliefs, and 
the dynamics are representative of many situations in real life, where it may take 
time to move from a particular state to another, potentially better state. The 
experimental results show robust learning over the five games. In the first game 
coordination appears to be very difficult, but payoffs increase as the number of 
unsuccessful transitions decreases with gained experience over the games. 
Nevertheless, only a small minority of groups in the baseline treatment learn to 
make the transition.  
We also contribute to the literature on framing. As will be detailed in the next 
section, the impact of the way in which a problem is described is rather 
ambiguous. It often depends on the type of game, the exact wording and kind of 
framing or labeling, and other aspects of the experimental design. In particular, 
we introduce environmental framing as treatment variable in our experiment.  
Our findings suggest that simply adding environmental context significantly 
increases the number of profitable transactions, but it also inhibits learning from 
past experiences and reduces coherence of strategies. Consequently, average 
payoffs in both treatments are very similar, even though the framing condition 
results in twice as many green technologies. Our results thus suggest general 
support for ‘going green’ but also more anchoring of beliefs: proponents and 
opponents stick more closely to their initial choices. 
2 Related literature 
Our paper is related to several strands of literature, both from experimental 
economics and environmental economics. The green transition game can be 
described as a dynamic stag hunt game, and is thus a special type of a coordination 
game which involves strategic uncertainty. Standard (static) coordination games 
typically have multiple Nash equilibria, where one is preferred (in terms of 
payoffs) to the other(s). For example, in a minimum effort game, the situation in 
which all players exert minimum effort is a Nash equilibrium. Although there are 
potentially great gains from coordinating on a high(er) effort level, the decision to 
exert (more) effort is risky. Many studies have examined the question which 
equilibrium will be selected, both theoretically and experimentally, but there is no 
clear answer. Theoretical arguments have been provided both supporting the 
selection of the risky, cooperative, pay-off dominant equilibrium (for sample, 
Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) as well as the safe, defecting,  risk-dominant one (for 
example Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993). Experimental findings in these games 
are also mixed and report coordination on both equilibria (Van Huyk et al. 1990, 
Cooper et al. 1990).  
Experimental evidence also suggests that the way in which players make 
decisions in these games, and thus the way in which equilibria are selected, 
depends on parameters of the experimental setting, like number of players, pay-
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off structure, riskiness of strategies, history of play etc., and numerous 
experiments have examined which factors, mechanisms or institutions may 
reduce the frequency of coordination failures.2 For instance, Battalio et al. (2001) 
documents that subjects’ behavior in three stag hunt games is affected by the 
optimization premium, the expected payoff difference between an individual’s 
best and inferior response to a particular strategy, in particular in the longer run. 
Another robust finding in these experiments is the considerable variation in 
behavior of groups. Actions in the first few repetitions of a game have a large 
impact on how groups behave in later repetitions (see e.g. Charness 2000). Groups 
that choose the pay-off dominant action in the first rounds typically maintain high 
levels of coordination across time, whereas groups that start with few cooperative 
decisions tend to converge to the risk dominant (pay-off dominated) outcome. 
Whether and how these findings translate to our experiment is ambiguous due to 
the many differences between these games and our game. Unlike most of the other 
stag hunt/coordination game experiments the green transition game is inherently 
dynamic in nature, has groups consisting of more than two players, and 
coordination on the good outcome cannot be realized immediately but takes time 
(multiple periods).   
Our paper is also related to a strand of literature that uses experiments to 
examine environmental problems, and which games are typically more dynamic 
in nature (like our game). For example, a series of papers studies so-called 
collective-risk social dilemmas, also called climate protection game (Milinski et al. 
2008, Tavoni et al. 2011, Barrett and Dannenberg 2012). This type of social 
dilemma is basically a threshold public good game, where people can contribute 
individually to a collective public good, and everyone suffers if the group fails to 
reach the target (because of dangerous climate change, for example). In all these 
studies groups have an incentive to avoid a loss, but the target may be certain or 
less certain, the consequences of crossing the threshold and the probability of 
crossing vary, etc. The basic version of this climate protection game is as follows 
(Milinski et al. 2008). Subjects participate in groups of six. At the beginning of the 
experiment subjects are endowed with €40 each. In each of 10 rounds they must 
decide whether to invest €0, €2, or €4 in a so-called climate account. If after 10 
rounds the total contributions of the group are at least €120 - so if on average 
subjects have contributed half of their endowment - every subject keeps the 
remainder of the endowment (i.e. the amounts not invested in the climate 
account). If the target level of €120 is not reached, a disaster may occur in which 
all group members lose their savings with a known, fixed probability of 90%, 50%, 
or 10%.3 Beliefs play a very important role in this game, like in our game. Subjects 
                                                        
2 Several studies have linked these coordination failures to macroeconomic phenomena such 
as why economies are stalled in low-productivity states or end up in a poverty trap (Bryant 1983, 
Cooper and John, 1998, Capra et al. 2009). Capra et al. (2009) is most related to our paper. They 
study the impact of simple communication and voting in a dynamic experimental macroeconomic 
environment with poverty traps and find that absent any institutions most economies (groups) 
converge to the poverty trap. With communication or voting some groups manage to reduce 
coordination failures, but only when these two institutions are combined the economies reliably 
escape the poverty trap in the longer run. They do not examine the effect of framing, however. 
3 Note that the experiment is based on a dynamic game, like the experiment of this paper. An 
important difference between this experiment and ours is that their payoffs are based on the 
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have a strong incentive to avoid the disaster and thus should invest if they believe 
that sufficient others will contribute, in particular in the 90% treatment. 
Nevertheless, Milinski et al. (2008) find that only five out of 10 groups managed 
to avoid the disaster by reaching the target in the 90% treatment whereas only 
one (no) group reached the target in the 50% (10%) treatment. This basic design 
has been extended to examine factors that may influence performance. For 
example, announcements (making a pledge) appear to increase the success rate 
(Tavoni et al. 2011)4 whereas introducing uncertainty about the level of the 
threshold yields even many more catastrophes (Barrett and Dannenberg 2012).5 
In all these papers, the ultimate outcome is most crucial, i.e. the fundamental issue, 
which largely determines the payoffs, is whether the threshold is reached or not. 
An important contribution of our paper is that the transition process itself is also 
very important. Even groups that end up in the state with clean technologies may 
realize low total earnings if they coordinate badly and thus attain low per period 
payoffs during the game. Furthermore, as far as we know, none of these studies 
looks at the effect of framing. 
Finally, our paper is linked to the literature on framing effects. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) use decision frame “to refer to the decision-maker’s conception 
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice”. They 
add “the frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the 
formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker”. This type of framing, sometimes called 
label framing, applies adequately to our design, and all changes we implement 
between the two treatments are purely textual. The game and choice options are 
exactly the same, but the formulation of the problem is different, and this may or 
may not affect the frame that subjects adopt as well as their behavior. Dufwenberg 
et al. (2011) stress the role of beliefs: “frames may influence a player’s beliefs, 
which influence his motivation as well as his beliefs of other’s choices and all of 
this influence his behavior.” Many experiments have been conducted to examine 
the effects of framing, both in individual decision-making situations (e.g. Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981, Bateman et al. 1997) and in decision-making in groups 
(Andreoni 1995, Cookson 2000). Here we focus on a few studies that use 
alternative wording in environmental problems. 6         
                                                        
realized situation at the end of the 10 rounds, whereas the payoff in our experiment is based on all 
rounds.  
4 The success rate of 50% in Tavoni et al. (2011) is much higher than the 10% in the 
corresponding treatment in Milinski et al. (2008). Barrett (2011) argues that this difference is due 
to the act that in Tavoni et al. (2011) the investments in the first three rounds are not made by the 
players themselves but by a computer. We would like to add that all findings are based on relatively 
few observations (groups). 
5 In the two treatments without (with) threshold uncertainty the catastrophe occurred two 
(16) out of 20 times. Note that before subjects in this experiment made their actual decisions, 
groups played five practice rounds where group membership was reshuffled. Therefore, the 
statistical results as reported by Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) should be interpreted with care 
as they are not based on independent observations.  
6 We do not discuss studies that look at valence framing, that is whether information is 
presented in a positive or negative light (e.g. give or take games). Also many studies have compared 
behavior between essentially the same games but with different names like the Community Game 
or the Wall Street Game. Typically, a community frame has a rather strong cooperation enhancing 
effect in prisoner’s dilemma games but a much weaker effect in public good games (see e.g. 
Ellingsen et al. 2012, Rege and Telle 2004).     
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Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2013) examine to what extent environmental 
context helps (pro-environmental) behavior and cooperation in a two-player 
dynamic public bad experiment. They argue that framing may affect behavior for 
at least two reasons. First of all, adding meaningful context to an otherwise 
abstract situation may make the situation more concrete and so help subjects to 
better understand the complex game setting (e.g. Cooper and Kagel, 2003, 2009). 
Secondly, framing may create additional noise/unobserved heterogeneity by 
invoking subjects’ (home-grown) preferences and experiences from outside the 
lab that are not directly linked to the situation in the lab. In the dynamic game of 
Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2013), subjects have to choose their production levels, 
which generate private revenues and emissions (the public bad). To allow for 
learning subject play 20 periods, and after a restart, another 20 periods of the 
same game. With inexperienced subjects, they find that in the treatment with 
environmental context (which uses pollution and cost of environmental damage) 
subjects choose significantly lower production levels than in the neutral setting 
(which uses common stock and common stock maintenance costs). However, after 
the restart, the effect of environmental context is weaker and treatment 
differences in the level of the public bad are no longer statistically significant. 
While this experiment has several properties in common with the experiment in 
this paper (i.e. it is one of the few dynamic public bad games, the environmental 
context), there are also some notable differences such as the number of subjects 
(two versus three), and the number of games/repetitions, but the most important 
differences is probably the type of game. Compared to their game, our game is 
more about coordination and is particularly suited to study transition processes.  
Cason and Raymond (2011) study framing effects in an emissions trading 
experiment with voluntary compliance. They hypothesized that subjects would 
find it more (morally) problematic to lie about ‘pollution levels’ than about simple 
’numbers’, such that compliance was expected to be higher in the treatment with 
environmental context than in the control treatment with neutral context. 
Contrary to their hypothesis, however, they find that environmental framing 
increases noncompliance significantly with subjects reporting levels of pollution 
below the actual levels. They argue that subjects comply less honestly with 
environmental context because they want to avoid the negative connotation of 
pollution that may be provoked when subjects honestly report high actual 
pollution levels (and not when they report just a high number). Although their 
results are hard to compare to ours, as the experiments differ in many dimensions, 
their findings clearly indicate that the effects of environmental framing are not 
always positive.   
 
3 Game and model specification 
The experiment is based on a simple three-player game, which may be 
considered to be a dynamic variant of a stag hunt game. A stag hunt game typically 
has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, a risk-dominant one and a payoff- dominant 
one. Our game is inherently dynamic as choices available to subjects in a round 
and payoffs per round also depend on decisions taken in earlier rounds. Note that 
unlike the stag hunt game our game only has one Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies; the outcome that maximizes payoffs is not a pure strategy equilibrium. 
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Here we describe the game by defining a formal model; the next section will 
explain the details of the game and the experimental design and procedure. For 
convenience of notation and analysis, we describe an infinite horizon autonomous 
game. The infinite game enables us to present in a relatively simple format some 
equilibria supported by consistent strategies and beliefs, to demonstrate that one 
unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and multiple mixed-strategy 
equilibria. One should keep in mind that the first aim of our experiment is to study 
if in this game groups are able to escape from the bad equilibrium of the initial 
state and transit to a better state with higher payoffs. Secondly, we want to 
examine whether adding meaningful environmental context could help groups 
make this transition easier and/or achieve higher payoffs, for instance because of 
improved coordination on a particular outcome. So, we do not intend to specify a 
full-fledged model including all equilibrium strategies or to compare outcomes 
with specific equilibria. When assessing the experiment outcomes, we rather test 
whether outcomes suggest multiplicity of equilibria among groups, and whether 
the outcomes are different for the two treatments. The analysis in this section 
sketches the theoretical background needed for these tests. 
 In our game, let i be the index for the subject i{1,2,3}, t the round, and 
bi(t){0,1,2,3} the number of blue chips subject i has at the beginning of round t.7 
The current state is described by the vector b(t)=(b1(t), b2(t), b3(t)), and the total 
number of blue chips in the group is B(t)=b1(t)+b2(t)+b3(t). In the first round, 
subjects are endowed with three purple chips and zero blue chips, so bi(1)=0 ∀ i 
and b(1) = (0, 0, 0). During each round, subjects have to decide whether or not 
they want to change the color of their chips; bi(t+1){0,1,2,3} denotes the number 
of blue chips subject i has at the beginning of round t+1, which is equal to the 
number of blue chips the subject has at the end of round t (i.e. after the change). 
In each round, subjects can change the color of at most one chip, and they cannot 
have less than zero or more than three chips of each color. Profits materialize at 
the end of a round and vi(b(t+1)) indicates the immediate payoff subject i receives 
at the end of round t. As payoff vi(b(t+1)) is symmetric for all subjects in a group, 
we only define the payoff in round t+1 for player 1, which  depends on b(t+1) and 
b(t) as follows: 
 
(1) 𝑣1(𝐛(𝑡 + 1)) = 10(3 − 𝑏1(𝑡 + 1)) + 𝐵(𝑡 + 1) if 𝐵(𝑡) < 5 
(2) 𝑣1(𝐛(𝑡 + 1)) = 10𝑏1(𝑡 + 1) + 𝐵(𝑡 + 1) if 𝐵(𝑡) > 4  
 
Note that the state in round t determines the so-called payoff scheme in round 
t+1, that is which color of chips are paid. The first part of the immediate payoff 
function gives the value of coordination, and presents the positive reinforcement 
of equal colored chips among the subjects. If the majority of chips are purple, as is 
the case in equation (1) since B(t) < 5, then each purple chip a subject has at the 
end of the round pays ten units. If the majority of chips are blue, as is the case in 
equation (2) since B(t) > 4, then each blue chip a subject has at the end of the round 
pays ten units. The second part of the immediate payoff function provides the 
public-good dimension of the game. That is, blue chips not only pay to their 
                                                        
7 In the analysis, we describe the game for the treatment with neutral framing, i.e. we only 
talk about purple and blue chips (and not about brown and green chips).  
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owners, but to the whole group. Each blue chip a group has at the end of round t 
yields 1 to every group member. Consequently, the initial state, when stationary, 
pays 𝑣1(0, 0, 0) = 30, while the maximal payoff is reached for the `bliss’ stationary 
state 𝑣1(3, 3, 3) = 39. 
The cumulative future payoff at the beginning of round t for subject i, 
𝜋𝑖(𝐛(𝑡), is given recursively by expectations, where we subtract a bliss-point or 
reference payoff ?̅? to ensure convergence: 
 
(3) 𝜋𝑖(𝐛(𝑡)) = 𝔼[𝑣𝑖(𝐛(𝑡 + 1)) − ?̅? + 𝜋𝑖(𝐛(𝑡 + 1))|𝐛(𝑡)] 
 
It is easy to verify that the following simple pure strategy is individually 
rational. All subjects increase their number of blue chips (if possible, that is, if bi(t) 
< 3) when B(t) > 4 and decrease their number of blue chips (if possible, that is, if 
bi(t) > 0) when B(t) < 5. Given this pure strategy, the game will quickly converge 
to the closest extreme steady state, b = (0, 0, 0) or b = (3, 3, 3). When the game 
starts at zero, it remains there indefinitely. As the initial state is a Nash 
equilibrium, we can expect that many groups will stay in this equilibrium. 
However, there may be other, more attractive equilibria and individuals could try 
to reach these. In particular there may be multiple equilibria in mixed strategies.  
Mixed strategies are described through the functions pi(b) and qi(b), which 
present the probability that subject i adds or drops a blue chip, respectively. We 
restrict the attention to symmetric strategies, consistent for permutations of b. 
Mixed strategies must satisfy the rationality condition that if pi(b)>0, then 
expected payoffs after switching a purple chip for a blue chip must not decrease, 
and if qi(b)>0, then expected payoffs after switching a blue chip for a purple chip 
must not decrease. 
Mixed strategies can become very complicated, with different kinds of inbuilt 
threats. In Appendix A we provide an example, where the expected payoffs are 
calculated relative to the bliss payoff of 39 (so that expected payoffs are negative 
and finite, because the game converges to the bliss outcome with probability 1). 
The example supports a full transition, but not immediate. Starting from b = (0, 0, 
0), all subjects play a mixed strategy in which they choose to switch a purple chip 
for a blue one with 65% probability. In 72% of the cases, at least two subjects will 
have one blue chip, and the transition continues in pure strategies. In 28% of the 
cases, one or no subject has a blue chip, and the same mixed strategy is repeated. 
It takes in most cases more than the minimal two rounds to converge to the bliss 
point. The expected transition costs are 43 units, while a fully coordinated (but 
not individually rational) transition would cost 39 units.8 The free-rider incentive, 
which makes the pure transition strategy individually irrational, increases costs 
by 4 units. 
4 Experiment 
Here we present some more information about the game, and the 
experimental design and procedure.  We will also formulate hypotheses, which 
                                                        
8 Here we define transition costs to be the expected decrease in cumulative payoffs relative 




will be tested in Section 5. The instructions used in the experiment can be found 
in Appendix B. 
 
4.1 The game  
The experiment is based on the formal game described in the previous 
section, but with a finite horizon. In particular, each experimental game consists 
of seven rounds. In every round a subject has exactly three chips, which may be 
purple or blue, and subjects have to decide simultaneously whether or not they 
want to change the color of one of their chips. In the first round, subjects are 
endowed with three purple chips and zero blue chips each. Depending on the pay-
off scheme that is implemented, each chip is either worth 10 tokens or nothing. 
There are two possible pay-off schemes: (1) pay-off scheme purple: each purple 
chip a subject has at the end of a round yields 10 tokens to the subject (whereas 
blue chips yield nothing); (2) pay-off scheme blue: each blue chip a subject has at 
the end of a round yields 10 tokens to the subject (whereas purple chips yield 
nothing). Which payoff scheme is implemented for a group in a round is 
determined automatically by a simple majority rule: if at the start of a round the 
majority of chips in a group are purple (blue) the purple (blue) pay-off scheme is 
realized (see equations (1) and (2)). Subjects know which pay-off scheme will be 
implemented in a round before choosing whether they want to change the color 
of one of their chips or not.  
The chips a subject has thus generate (private) pay-offs for the subject, which 
depend on the color of the chips and the pay-off scheme that is implemented in 
that round. On top of this, blue chips have a public-good type of feature: every blue 
chip a group member has generates a pay-off of one to all group members, 
irrespective of the applied pay-off scheme.  
If all group members keep their purple chips in every round, pay-off scheme 
purple is implemented during the entire game, and a benchmark (status quo) pay-
off of 210 tokens per subject is reached in the game. In contrast, immediate and 
full transition by all group members results in a total of 18 blue chips and a pay-
off of 234 tokens per person over all rounds of a game.9  
Some remarks are in order. First of all, it should be noticed that, by design, 
pay-off scheme blue can only be implemented (B(t) > 4) if at least two subjects 
have changed (some of) their chips, so a single individual cannot bring about a 
transition. Second, the gains from a successful, symmetric and simultaneous 
transition are relatively modest (234 versus 210) but equal for all subjects. An 
important feature of our dynamic game is that the transition is costly in the sense 
that in Rounds 1 and 2, subjects’ payoffs are lower – namely 16 and 23, 
respectively – than in the status quo situation of the bad equilibrium where no 
                                                        
9 The benchmark (status quo) payoff of 210 tokens per game per subject follows from 3 
purple chips × 10 tokens × 7 rounds. For the group it would be much better if all group members 
transited immediately and fully to the blue chips. Summing the blue chips a subject has at the end 
of each round then gives 1 + 2 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 18 blue chips over the game. As the group’s 
majority color of the chips at the beginning of a round determines which payoff scheme is 
implemented, payoff scheme purple will be implemented in rounds 1 and 2, and payoff scheme 
blue from round 3 onwards. The payoffs resulting from immediate, full transition are 23 tokens in 
round 1 (2×10 tokens + 3×1 token), 16 tokens in round 2 (1×10 tokens + 6×1 token), and 39 tokens 
in rounds 3 to 7 (3×10 tokens + 9×1 token), for a total of 234 tokens per subject.     
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changes are made. Third, immediate and full transition does not give the highest 
payoffs, neither at the individual level, nor at the group level. Consider the 
following situation. Two group members start changing their chips in Round 1, 
whereas one group member lags behind one round, i.e. he keeps all purple chips 
in Round 1, and only starts changing chips from Round 2 onwards. This strategy 
increases total group payoffs from 702 (= 3 × 234) to 703 tokens.10 Although the 
average individual gains from this strategy are very small (234.33 versus 234), the 
benefits are unequally divided: the two ‘leading’ subjects realize 231 tokens each 
whereas the ‘laggard’ earns 241 tokens. Hence, one characteristic of the game is 
that full immediate transition is no equilibrium as it may be attractive for an 
individual to choose a strategy of lagging behind one round. Indeed, a subject 
following this strategy can guarantee that he earns the most of all group members. 
We believe that the possibility of profitable deviations, which resembles 
somewhat a dynamic type of free-riding in a standard public good game, is an 
appealing and realistic feature of the green transition game. 
 
4.2 Experimental design and procedures 
In total 78 subjects participated in the experiment reported in this paper, in 
26 groups of three subjects. The subjects participated in (only) one out of four 
sessions, run in the CentERlab at Tilburg University. The experimental design is 
summarized in Table 1. There are two experimental treatments, called baseline 
(BSL), and framing (FRM), which differ only slightly; details are provided below. 
For each treatment we conducted two sessions, and a session lasted on average 
about one hour.  
In each session, subjects were randomly allocated to computers and to 
groups, and subjects could not identify who was in their group. The same 
experimenter distributed instructions (included in Appendix B) and read them 
aloud to establish common knowledge. The experiment was programmed in Z-
tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Group composition stayed the same for all rounds and 
games in the experiment (partner matching), which resulted in 13 independent 
observations (groups) per treatment.  
 
TABLE 1: Experimental design 
Treatment Name # groups # subjects # games 
Baseline BSL 13 39 65 
Framing  FRM 13 39 65 
 
The baseline treatment consisted of five repetitions of the seven-round game 
described in the previous subsection. The subjects were told that each round 
                                                        
10 The number of blue chips the group has at the end of the rounds is 2, 5, 8, 9, 9, 9, 9, which 
gives an average of 17 blue chips per individual. As with immediate full transition, payoff scheme 
purple will be implemented in rounds 1 and 2, and payoff scheme blue from round 3 onwards. The 
payoffs for the two ‘leading’ group members are 22 tokens in round 1 (2×10 tokens + 2×1 token), 
15 tokens in round 2 (1×10 tokens + 5×1 token), 38 tokens in round 3 (3×10 tokens + 8×1 token), 
and 39 tokens in rounds 4 to 7 (3×10 tokens + 9×1 token), for a total of 231 tokens. The payoffs of 
the ‘laggard’ are 32 tokens in round 1 (3×10 tokens + 2×1 token), 25 tokens in round 2 (2×10 
tokens + 5×1 token), 28 tokens in round 3 (2×10 tokens + 8×1 token), and 39 tokens in rounds 4 
to 7 (3×10 tokens + 9×1 token), for a total of 241 tokens. If two or more subjects follow this 
strategy, total group payoffs go down. 
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consisted of the following three stages. In Stage 1, subjects were informed about 
the number of purple and blue chips they had and the number of purple and blue 
chips their group had at the start of that round. Then subjects were informed 
about the two possible payoff schemes and the payoff scheme that would be 
implemented in the round: if the majority of chips in a group were purple (blue), 
payoff scheme purple (blue) was employed. In Stage 2, subjects indicated privately 
and simultaneously whether they wanted to change one purple into one blue chip, 
one blue chip into one purple chip, or did not want to make a change by clicking a 
radio button. At most one chip could be changed in every round. The total number 
of chips a subject had was always three, as was the maximum number of chips of 
a particular color. Negative numbers of chips were not allowed. Finally, in Stage 3, 
subjects were informed about the number of purple and blue chips they had (after 
the change), the number of purple and blue chips their group had (after the 
change) and their personal payoffs for the round. Remember that in addition to 
the payoff resulting from a subject’s own chips and the payoff scheme, each blue 
chip the group had in Stage 3 yielded one token to each group member. Both types 
of payoffs were shown to the subjects. After Stage 3, the round was over and 
subjects continued with the next round of the game. During a round, subjects could 
see the information of all previous stages of that round.  
The only difference between the baseline treatment and the framing 
treatment are the instructions. Instead of using neutral language, the instructions 
in treatment FRM included environmentally loaded context (green framing) with 
references to clean and dirty technologies and to subsidies. The text stated that 
subjects started with three brown chips (instead of purple as in treatment BSL) 
which could be changed for green chips (instead of blue chips). In addition, it said 
“The brown chips represent dirty technologies that use exhaustible resources like 
fossil fuels and that contribute to climate change. The green chips represent clean 
technologies, using renewable resources like solar and wind energy. In the game 
you play, you invest in fossil fuels or in renewable energy by deciding on the 
chips“. No such connection to technologies was made in treatment BSL. Finally 
whereas in treatment BSL the public good feature of the blue chips was described 
as “On top of that, and irrespective of the payoff scheme, each blue chip your group 
has at the end of the round yields 1 token to each of the group members”, in treatment 
FRM it read “In addition to the payoffs that are determined by the dominant 
technology, we subsidize green chips. Each green chip your group has at the end of 
the round yields 1 token to each of the group members (irrespective of the 
infrastructure)” (italics and underlining in original text). Apart from these 
differences in the instructions (see Appendix B for the full texts), the procedure in 
the two experimental conditions was exactly the same, so also treatment FRM had  
five games of seven rounds, etc. Therefore in what follows we will use the language 
of the baseline treatment, and talk about purple and blue chips. In both treatments 
we had 13 three-person groups.  
After the last round of a game, subjects received information about their total 
payoffs in that game, and then they continued with the first round of a new game.  
After all five games, one game was randomly selected by the computer to be paid, 
and subjects were informed about their earnings in the selected game. After the 
experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, with an exchange rate of 





Before formulating the hypotheses we first summarize the boundaries of the 
possible outcomes of the game. On the one end, subjects can preserve the status 
quo with only purple chips. We consider this outcome the benchmark. There is no 
transition, the number of blue chips is 0, and game payoffs are 210 for each 
subject. On the other end, subjects can implement the fastest possible transition. 
Each subject adds one blue chip each round, so that after two rounds the transition 
is made and the total number of blue chips that any subject has collected over the 
game amounts to 18. The individual payoffs are 234. As explained in the previous 
subsection, the average payoff can be further increased if one subject delays the 
transition one round. That strategy decreases the average total number of blue 
chips in the game by one but increases total group payoffs by one. Hence, average 
subject payoff increases by one-third to 234.3. When describing the results, we 
will also use the variable transition speed, which gives the pace at which the 
transition is made (minimum value is 0 in case of no transition, maximum speed 
is 6 if number of blue chips is at least 5 at the end of round 2).   
We formulate a series of hypotheses that we test with the experimental data. 
Broadly speaking the order of the hypotheses is such that they move from more 
general, aggregate behavior to more specific, individual behavior. The approach is 
to formulate a series of explicit null hypotheses, which basically state the neutral 
effect of no change. Then, for each hypothesis we speculate about reasonable 
alternatives/expected outcomes and include these in the text.   
As explained above, there is only one pure Nash strategy, upholding the 
benchmark. As the game is complex, only after the experience of some games will 
groups probably understand the properties of the game and learn to coordinate. 
The first null hypothesis is that subjects do not learn and therefore behavior does 
not change across games. We split the hypothesis in three parts, one for the 
number of blue chips, one for profits, and one for transition speed because (lack 
of) coordination may affect these measures differently.  
An even stricter version of this hypothesis is that the status quo situation will 
be sustained in every round and every game, resulting in zero blue chips, average 
game payoffs of 210, and zero transition speed. Alternatively, one may expect that 
over the games, groups improve their performance. We therefore speculate that 
the number of blue chips, the profits, and the transition speed increase over 
games. Furthermore, we conjecture that after sufficient experience (e.g. in later 
games) profits exceed the benchmark payoff of 210. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1A. (Learning – Blues) Number of blue chips is constant over games.  
HYPOTHESIS 1B. (Learning – Profits) Profits are constant over games. 
HYPOTHESIS 1C. (Learning – Transition speed) Transition speed is constant over 
games. 
 
The second hypothesis considers the aggregate treatment effect of green 
framing. The null hypothesis, as formulated in HYPOTHESIS 2, is that the number of 
blue chips, the profits, and the transition speed are equal in the two treatments. 
After all, the game subjects play – including the equilibrium predictions – is exactly 
the same in both treatments and pro-environmental behavior in the lab has no 
real environmental impact outside the lab. Alternatively, as also has been argued 
in the literature (e.g. Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin 2013), adding meaningful context 
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(including subsidies) may affect behavior. In particular, we speculate that green 
framing affects all relevant measures such that the number of blue chips, the 
profit, and the transition speed are higher in treatment FRM than in treatment 
BSL, both in the short run (in Game 1) and when subjects have gained more 
experience (in Game 5).   
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. (Aggregate Treatment Effect) The number of blue chips (A), profits 
(B), and the transition speed (C) are the same in both treatments, both in the 
short run (Game 1) and in the long run (Game 5).  
 
The two hypotheses about aggregate behavior can be tested by comparing the 
three measures across games and across treatments.  
The next hypotheses are about group and individual behavior. Although 
HYPOTHESIS 2 predicts no differences between the two treatments, several studies 
have shown that framing may have an effect. If this is the case, one would like to 
get an idea why. At least two possible mechanisms have been put forward in the 
literature. First of all, adding meaningful context to an otherwise abstract situation 
may make the situation more concrete and so help subjects to better understand 
the complex game setting (e.g. Cooper and Kagel, 2009). Secondly, framing may 
create additional noise/unobserved heterogeneity by invoking subjects’ (home-
grown) preferences and experiences from outside the lab that are not directly 
linked to the situation in the lab. The joint effect of these forces is not clear ex ante 
and what the outcome will be is basically an empirical question. For example, 
context may or may not help to form similar beliefs and to coordinate.  
By formulating and testing HYPOTHESIS 3 and HYPOTHESIS 4 we hope to be able 
to say something about the underlying mechanisms. We formulate the hypotheses 
based on the arguments mentioned above. First, we hypothesize that behavior 
within a group is not coordinated. In particular, the null hypothesis, as formulated 
in HYPOTHESIS 3 is that within a group individual decisions are made 
independently. Alternatively, we speculate that subjects learn to coordinate their 
decisions such that choices in the first round of a later game are more 
coherent/coordinated than in the first round of the first game(s). For each game 
and treatment we can test whether the observed shares of coherent groups (i.e. 
groups with all-purple or all-blue chips at the end of Round 1) in the experiment 
are equal to the expected share following from the null hypothesis. We speculate 
that as the subjects accumulate experience with each game, the share of groups 
with the same choices in Round 1 rises.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. (Independent Round 1 strategies) Within groups, individual choices 
in Round 1 are independent. 
 
Regarding the effect of environmental context the null hypothesis is that 
Round 1 decisions are independent of the framing, both in Game 1 (HYPOTHESIS 4A) 
and in later games (HYPOTHESIS 4B). Alternatively, we speculate that framing has 
an effect on the decisions subjects make in Round 1, but we do not know whether 
the effect will be positive or negative. If meaningful context helps subjects to 
better understand the complex game, this improved comprehension may induce 
them to make different choices, and it may make coordination easier and 
coherence higher. On the other hand, as mentioned above, adding environmental 
15 
 
context may invoke subjects’ preferences, and create unobserved heterogeneity 
which may lead to fragmented decisions. Both effects may already come about in 
Round 1 of Game 1, or in later games, or both. That is, already in the very first 
round the context may influence decision making, and lead to divergent 
preferences/beliefs about what the group should do. Differences in later games 
may be caused by the fact that framing may induce subjects to adjust their 
behavior less to experiences in previous games because of entrenched positions 
or may make them base their choices more on their own principles and their own 
past choices rather than on others’ choices (anchoring).   
 
HYPOTHESIS 4A. (Short-run treatment effect in Round 1) Decisions in Round 1 of 
Game 1 are the same in both treatments. 
HYPOTHESIS 4B. (Longer-run treatment effect in Round 1) Decisions in Round 1 of 
Games 2 – 5 are the same in both treatments. 
 
Although it may be difficult to disentangle these and other possible motives, 
we can test whether first round decisions and coherence are the same in both 
treatments or not, both in Game 1 and in later games. 
The last hypotheses are about changes in behavior within a game and 
between games. As said, differences between the two treatments – if any – may 
arise from distinct choices already in the very first round of the experiment or 
come from divergent decisions and reactions during the game(s). The first null 
hypothesis, formulated as HYPOTHESIS 5, states that the decisions an individual 
makes in a subsequent round do not depend on the choices of the group members 
in earlier rounds of that game, such that there is no coordination within a game. 
Alternatively, we speculate that a subject’s decision in a round is influenced by the 
choices the other group members have made in the previous round, such that 
coordination is expected to take place.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 5. (Coordination within games) Individual choices are independent of 
earlier group behavior in a game. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6 extends HYPOTHESIS 5 to consider the effect of environmental 
context. The null hypothesis is that the relationship between an individual’s 
decisions and earlier decisions of the group members does not depend on the 
framing and hence is the same in the two treatments. Alternatively, we speculate 
that framing affects the way individuals react to group experience. In particular, 
we conjecture that framing weakens this relationship, mainly because 
environmental context may induce people to anchor more on their own 
preferences. Accordingly, subsequent-round choices depend less on same game 
group experience and more on individual past round behavior. For example, a 
person who cares deeply about environmental issues (outside the lab) may be 
prepared to invest in green technologies, even if the other group members have 
not done so (yet). On the other hand, someone may argue that if clean technologies 
need subsidies they are not really financially sound, and this person may choose 
to stick to dirty technologies. Although these divergent views and interpretations 
of the game may also exist in the baseline treatment, it seems reasonable to expect 




HYPOTHESIS 6. (Framing and coordination within games) Framing has no effect on 
the relation between individual choices and earlier group behavior in a game. 
   
The last two hypotheses are very similar to HYPOTHESIS 5 and HYPOTHESIS 6, but 
instead of comparing decisions in two ensuing rounds of the same game, they 
examine whether decisions in a particular round of two subsequent games are 
related. The null hypothesis is that the choice an individual makes in a particular 
round of a particular game is not related to choices made by the group members 
in the preceding game. Consequently, as formulated in HYPOTHESIS 7, decisions 
between games are not coordinated. Alternatively, we speculate that over the 
games, individuals learn to coordinate such that an individual’s choice in a round 
does depend on choices of other group members in the same round of the previous 
game.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 7. (Coordination between games) Individual choices are independent of 
group behavior in the preceding game. 
 
The last hypothesis relates to the effect of environmental context. The null 
hypothesis, as formulated in HYPOTHESIS 8, is that the relationship between an 
individual’s decisions and decisions of the group members in the preceding game 
does not depend on the framing and hence is the same in the two treatments.  
Alternatively, and for similar reasons as stated above, we speculate that framing 
makes individuals react less to group experience from earlier games. For example, 
we expect that in treatment FRM an individual’s choice in Round 1 of Game 2 
depends less on the decisions of the other group members in Round 1 of Game 1 
than in treatment BSL. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 8. (Framing and coordination between games) Framing has no effect on 
the relation between individual choices and group behavior in the preceding 
game. 
 
In Section 5 we will test all eight hypotheses. The first four hypotheses will be 
tested by means of non-parametric tests, the last four in a regression. 
5 Results 
In this section we present the results of the experiment. Before testing the 
hypotheses we first discuss some general results in section 5.1. Then, in sections 
5.2 and 5.3 we test the hypotheses that relate to behavior at the aggregate and the 
group or individual level, respectively.    
5.1 General results 
We first present an impression of the data and the results at the aggregate 
level. The full set of outcomes, at the group level, is provided in the Appendix C, in 
FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4. TABLE 2 gives average summary statics of some key variables 
for each game, aggregated over groups and rounds, for both treatments. Total blue 
chips is the total number of blue chips an individual has accumulated in a game 
(maximum 18); profits indicate the individual payoff over an entire game; and 
transition speed gives the speed at which the transition is made (minimum value 
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0 in case of no transition, maximum speed is 6 if number of blue chips is at least 5 
at the end of Round 2). FIGURE 1 shows for both treatments and across all rounds 
the average number of blue chips per individual (bottom lines, left axis) and the 
average individual payoffs (top lines, right axis) per round.  
 
TABLE 2: Blue chips, profits and transition speed per game and treatment 
 Total blue chips  Profits  Transition speed 
Game BSL FRM BSL FRM BSL FRM 
1 4.2 11.3 *** 197 194 1.0 3.8 *** 
2 6.1 11.2 * 204 209 1.6 3.9 ** 
3 4.6 11.1 * 208 212 1.3 3.9 ** 
4 5.6 10.6 212 212 1.8 3.5 
5 4.0 10.6 * 213 216 1.3 3.5 * 
Average 4.9 10.9 ** 207 209 1.4 3.7 ** 
* FRM significantly different from BSL at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% (Mann-
Whitney U-tests; groups as units of observations). 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Blue chips and payoffs, per game and treatment 
Per individual, averaged over subjects; bottom lines show blue chips (left vertical axis), top lines 
profits (right vertical axis) 
 
Inspection of TABLE 2 and FIGURE 1 suggests some first observations. Firstly, 
although the average total number of blue chips is positive, it is much lower than 
the maximum possible sum of 18, even in treatment FRM where the number of 
blue chips is about twice as high as in treatment BSL. FIGURE 1 reveals that subjects 
in treatment BSL rarely have more than one blue chip on average, whereas in later 
rounds of treatment FRM subjects basically have two blue chips on average. 
Secondly, the results indicate a substantial coordination problem: in both 
treatments the average payoff per individual in Games 1 and 2 (and the average 
over five games) is below the status quo payoff of 210 (and profits below 30 in 
most rounds). Thirdly, there is some evidence of learning; payoffs in later games 
(4, 5) exceed those in early games (1, 2), also in the baseline treatment, although 
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within a treatment and at the aggregate level. Finally, whereas for all games the 
number of blue chips and the transition speed vary markedly between the two 
treatments, the total payoffs are remarkably close. The difference in patterns of 
profits per round in FIGURE 1, however, suggests that these payoffs are not realized 
in similar ways. 
In order to take a somewhat closer look at the general results we classify game 
outcomes into three categories. First, those games where on a group level four or 
fewer blue chips (on average, 1.3 per individual) were chosen are labeled as 
‘coordinated on purple’ or ‘no transition’. For these games (with B(t) < 5), we find 
that purple is always the majority color, and thus the purple payment scheme is 
implemented. Therefore each blue chip decreases the individual payoff by 10 
token, while it increases the group payoff by 3 token, so that the total group payoff 
decreases by 7 token. Per person, the payoff thus decreases with 7/3 per 
additional blue chip. Second, we consider those games where more than four chips 
are blue, over the full game (so with B(t) > 4), and where payoffs at least equal the 
benchmark payoff. These games are labeled ‘coordination on blue’ or ‘profitable 
transition’; they present a successful transition to blue. The third category of 
games consists of those where more than four blue chips were chosen, but where 
payoffs fell short of the benchmark payoff. These games are labeled ‘no 
coordination’ or ‘costly transition’. We note that in all costly transition games the 
blue payment scheme remained after the first round in which it was implemented 
(so after B(t) > 4). That is, no group went back to purple once blue was 
implemented. 
 FIGURE 2 shows the game outcomes, per treatment, per game, by outcome 
classification. It reveals several clearly observable patterns. Firstly, in both 
treatments the number of games classified as ‘costly transition’ (grey bars) 
decreases over the games. So subjects learn to avoid this costly outcome, in 
particular in treatment FRM where in the very first game many groups 
experienced a costly transition. Secondly, in treatment BSL subjects realize very 
few profitable transactions (blue bars), and in later games coordination seems to 
focus on ‘no transition’ (purple bars). In treatment FRM, on the other hand, the 
share of profitable transitions increases across games. Moreover, with framing in 
every game more groups experience a profitable transition than no transition, 





 FIGURE 2. Game coordination outcome types per game and treatment 
 
5.2 Testing aggregate behavior (hypotheses 1-2) 
We examine first whether groups learn over games or not, as stated in 
HYPOTHESIS 1. We use the data of TABLE 2 to see if the number of blue chips, the 
profits and the transition speed increase from one game to the next one (short-
run effect) and to compare the averages between Games 5 and 1 (long-run effect). 
As TABLE 2 shows, in most of the cases, the total number of blue chips does not 
change much over games and the difference between one game and the next is 
never bigger than two. For both treatments, HYPOTHESIS 1A that the number of blue 
chips does not change across games cannot be rejected; both the short-run and 
the longer-run effects on the number of blue chips are not significant (two-sided 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks with groups as units of observation, n = 13, 
all p > 0.21) apart from the change from Games 4 to 5 in the baseline treatment (p 
= 0.03, n = 13). The results for the payoffs are slightly different. The change in 
profits from Game 1 to Game 2 is significant in both treatments (n = 13, p = 0.10, 
and p = 0.03 for treatments BSL and FRM, respectively), but none of the other 
short-run effects are. The long-run effect on profits is also significant (n = 13, p ≤ 
0.01 for both treatments). So the hypothesis of no change in profits (HYPOTHESIS 
1B) can partly be rejected in favor of the alternative speculation. However, we find 
no evidence that after sufficient experience profits exceed the benchmark profit 
level of 210. To the contrary, for both treatments we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that profits in Games 2 to 5 are equal to 210 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test, n=13, all p > 0.10) whereas profits in Game 1 appear to significantly lower 
than the benchmark payoff (p < 0.02 for both treatments). Hence the rise in 
payoffs over the games seems more due to the fact that groups learn to avoid the 
very low profits of Game 1 rather than successfully realizing profits that exceed 
the status quo level.  The results for the transition speed are very similar to those 
for the blue chips. HYPOTHESIS 1C, which states that the transition speed is constant 
over games cannot be rejected for any treatment (two-sided Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks gives p > 0.11, n= 13 for all comparisons in treatment BSL and 
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each panel one treatment; horizontal axis: 5 games; vertical axis: shares
bars: dark blue=coordinated on profitable transition to blue, gray=costly transition, purple=no transition
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stable and – at least at the aggregate level – not much learning seems to be going 
on, in particular not after Game 2. 
Next we use the data in TABLE 2 to examine the treatment effect at the 
aggregate level, as formulated in HYPOTHESIS 2.  The stars in the columns of TABLE 
2 indicate the outcomes of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test with groups as units 
of observation when testing whether the two values in the two columns to the left 
are significantly different or not (n1 = 13, n2 = 13 for all comparisons). The results 
depend very much on the variable under consideration. Both the total number of 
blue chips accumulated in a game and the transition speed are significantly 
different in treatment FRM in all games except Game 4, and often so at high levels 
of significance. In contrast, profits are much more similar in the two treatments 
and do not differ significantly in any of the games (all p > 0.49) – as was also 
suggested by FIGURE 1.  Consequently, the support for HYPOTHESIS 2 is mixed: 
whereas the null hypothesis of no treatment effect can be rejected for the number 
of blue chips and the transition speed, there is no evidence that framing affects 
profits in the short or in the long run. 
 
5.3 Testing group level and individual behavior (hypotheses 3-8) 
In order to find out more about the mechanisms behind these results we now 
focus on group and individual behavior. As argued in section 4.3, treatment 
differences may already arise in the very first round of a game, for example 
because context creates differences in beliefs, or they may develop when beliefs 
and strategies evolve within a game or across games. In some groups, subjects may 
play consistently blue, in other groups subjects may play consistently purple, 
while in still other groups subjects’ behavior may be not be coordinated at all. The 
null hypothesis (HYPOTHESIS 3) is that all subjects decide on their first-round choice 
independently. We expect, however, that subjects learn that it is beneficial to 
coordinate their actions within their group, such that decisions by group members 
are correlated. In addition, HYPOTHESIS 4 states the null hypotheses that framing 
has no effect on first-round coordination, neither in the short run (HYPOTHESIS 4A) 
or in the longer run (HYPOTHESIS 4B).  
TABLE 3 presents the information needed to test HYPOTHESIS 3 and HYPOTHESIS 
4. The left panel of TABLE 3 shows the average share of blue chips individuals have 
in the first round of a game (g) for each treatment (x) separately (pxg). The data 
indicate, for instance, that in all games of treatment FRM slightly more than 50% 
of the subjects switch one purple chip for a blue one in Round 1. The right panel 
of TABLE 3 shows the observed share of coherent groups, i.e. the share of groups 
that have all-purple chips or all-blue chips in the first round of a game in a 
treatment (osxg). It shows for example that in treatment FRM at the end of Round 
1 of Game 1 in only two out of 13 groups (=0.15) all three group members have 
the same color chips, whereas this is ten out of 13 (0.77) in Round 1 of Game 4 in 




TABLE 3. Share of blue chips and observed share of coherent groups in first round, 
per game and treatment 
 Share (pxg)  Coherence (osxg)  
Game BSL  FRM  BSL FRM 
1 .38  .54  .31 .15 
2 .38  .59  .54 * .15 
3 .28  .54  .62 * .38 
4 .36  .51  .77 ***  .38 
5 .26  .51  .69 *  .54 ** 
Stars denote differences between expected and observed shares; *significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1% (binomial tests). 
 
Under the null hypothesis of independent decisions, if a share p of subjects 
chooses blue in a round, the expected share es of all-blue groups plus all-purple 
groups is p3 + (1–p)3. For each game (g) and treatment (x) we can test whether the 
observed share osxg in the experiment, as shown in the right panel of the table, is 
equal to the expected share esxg where   
 
(4) 𝑒𝑠𝑥𝑔 = 𝑝𝑥𝑔
3 + (1 − 𝑝𝑥𝑔)
3 
 
with the values of pxg taken from the left panel of TABLE 3.11  
We see from TABLE 3 that the observed share of coherent groups varies 
considerably, both within treatments as across treatments, and much more than 
the share of blue chips.  In the very first round of the experiment, coherence is very 
low and the observed share of coherent groups is not significantly different from 
the expected share. In both treatments coherence tends to increase over games, 
although the rise is clearly larger and faster in the baseline treatment. Using two-
sided binomial tests, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of independent 
strategies within a group (HYPOTHESIS 3) for all games after Game 1 for the baseline 
treatment. With framing, on the other hand, the observed share of coherent 
groups does not differ significantly from the expected share with the exception of 
the final game. Given that the shares of blue chips are remarkably stable across 
games, we can conclude that the increase in coherence is largely unrelated to the 
development of the shares of blue chips. 
Regarding potential treatments differences (HYPOTHESIS 4), TABLE 3 – and the 
different starting points of the lines in the lower part of FIGURE 1 – indicates that 
the average number of blue chips per individual in Rounds 1 is consistently higher 
in treatment FRM than in treatment BSL. Formally testing HYPOTHESIS 4 gives 
mixed support though. For Round 1 of Game 1 we cannot reject the first part of 
the null hypothesis (HYPOTHESIS 4A) that the shares are the same in both 
treatments (Fisher exact test with all individual decisions, n1 = 39, n2 = 39, p > 
0.25), whereas we can reject HYPOTHESIS 4B as the average fractions over Games 
2-5 are significantly different (Mann-Whitney U test, one average fraction per 
group, n1 = 13, n2 = 13, p = 0.06). So, although there seems to be an immediate 
effect of environmental context, resulting in more blue chips in the first rounds of 
a game, the treatment effect becomes only significant in the somewhat longer run. 
                                                        
11 Given the shares of blues presented in TABLE 3, the values of the expected shares esxg range 
from 0.25 when pxg = 0.51 to 0.43 when pxg = 0.26.  
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At the same time, as we have seen, framing does not lead to more coherence. On 
the contrary, whereas groups in the baseline treatment learn to coordinate their 
decisions in the first round of later games, behavior of groups in treatment FRM is 
and remains much less harmonized. Only in the very last game a reasonable 
number of groups manage to coordinate their decisions from the start of the game, 
which explains the relatively low level of payoffs in this treatment. 
The last hypotheses are about changes in behavior within a game (HYPOTHESIS 
5 and HYPOTHESIS 6) and between games (HYPOTHESIS 7 and HYPOTHESIS 8). As said, 
differences between the two treatments – if any – may arise from distinct choices 
already in the very first round of a game or come from divergent decisions and 
reactions later in the game. As we not only want to consider the decisions of the 
other group members, but also want to control for a subject’s own decision, we 
test these hypotheses by means of regression, using several specifications. In all 
specifications the number of blue chips a subject has in a round is regressed on 
the subject’s own number of blue chips and the average number of blue chips of 
the other group members. Specifications (1)–(3) include the variables of the 
previous round of the same game as explanatory variables, and specifications (4)–
(6) use variables of the same round of the previous game (see TABLE 4, G refers to 
game, R to round). To take into account that choices within a group are not 
independent, all errors are clustered within groups.   
 
TABLE 4. OLS regressions for first-round choices 
 Within  games Across games 




















VARIABLES BSL FRM Both BSL FRM Both 
        
Own Blue G1R1 0.520** 0.979*** 0.520*** 0.339* 0.127 0.339** 
 (0.187) (0.156) (0.184) (0.158) (0.126) (0.156) 
Own Blue G1R1×T    0.460*   -0.211 
   (0.240)   (0.199) 
Av. Blue others G1R1 0.347*** 0.236*** 0.347*** 0.455** -0.291 0.455** 
 (0.0694) (0.0615) (0.0684) (0.177) (0.215) (0.174) 
Av. Blue others G1R1×T    -0.111   -0.746** 
   (0.0914)   (0.275) 
Constant -0.0756 0.0403 -0.0756 0.0794 0.678*** 0.0794 
 (0.0754) (0.128) (0.0744) (0.117) (0.138) (0.115) 
Treatment Dummy (T)   0.116   0.598*** 
   (0.147)   (0.179) 
       
N 39 39 78 39 39 78 
R-squared 0.464 0.561 0.573 0.228 0.064 0.182 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. 
 
We first test HYPOTHESIS 5, which states that the decisions individuals make in 
a subsequent round do not depend on the choices of the group members in earlier 
rounds of that game, such that there is no coordination within a game. 
Alternatively, we predict that a subject’s decision in a round is influenced by the 
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choices the other group members have made in the previous round. We test the 
hypothesis using data of the first two rounds in the first game, as this sample gives 
the cleanest test. Specifications (1) and (2) show that in both treatments both the 
subject’s own blue chips and the average number of blue chips of the other group 
members in Round 1 of Game 1 have a positive and significant effect on the blue 
chips an individual has in Round 2 of Game 1.12 Therefore we can reject the 
hypothesis that choices are independent of group behavior earlier in the game in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis that a subject’s decision in a round is influenced 
by the choices the other group members have made in the previous round of the 
same game.  
Specification (3) shows the estimation results for both treatments together, 
with a treatment dummy for treatment FRM (T) and interaction terms between 
the explanatory variables and the treatment dummy. The results indicate that the 
coefficient of the subject’s own choice of Round 1 is significantly higher in 
treatment FRM than in treatment BSL, but the reaction to the other group 
members’ previous choices does not differ significantly between the two 
treatments. Hence, we cannot reject HYPOTHESIS 6 that framing has no effect on the 
relationship between individual choices and earlier group behavior within a game.  
The last three specifications show the results of a similar exercise, but here 
the dependent variable is the number of blue chips a subject has in Round 1 of 
Game 2. The regression results for the baseline treatment, shown in specification 
(4), illustrate that a subject’s decision in the first round of Game 2 depends 
significantly on the subject’s own decision and on the average group decision in 
Round 1 of Game 1. For treatment FRM, however, both coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero such that the number of blue chips the group had 
in the first game does not influence whether an individual changes the color of a 
chip in the first round of Game 2 (see specification (5)). Actually, given that only 
the constant is high and very significant, the group’s history (including the 
subject’s own decision) in Game 1 does not seem to play a role at all in treatment 
FRM. The evidence for HYPOTHESIS 7 about coordination between games is thus 
mixed: for treatment BSL we can reject the null hypothesis that a subject’s decision 
in Round 1 of Game 2 does not depend on the other group members’ decision in 
Round 1 of Game 1, while for treatment FRM we cannot reject the no-coordination 
hypothesis.  
Finally, possible treatments differences (HYPOTHESIS 8) can be detected more 
directly from specification (6). The results show that the estimated coefficients of 
the subject’s own previous game first-round choice are similar for both 
treatments, but that the effect of the previous game decisions of the other group 
members is very different. In particular, we can reject HYPOTHESIS 8 in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that the relation between individual choices and group 
behavior is influenced by framing. 
Taken together, the regression results suggest that environmental context 
affects individual choices in (at least) two ways. Within a game, framing induces 
individuals to stick more closely to their initial choices, whereas across games 
framing makes subjects follow less closely the initial choices of their group 
                                                        
12 It may be worth noting that the estimated coefficients of own blue G1R1 are smaller than 
1. This means that if the other group members do not have any blue chips in the first round, a 
subject has on average less than one blue chip in Round 2, even if she had one in Round 1. This 
(negative) effect is stronger in the baseline treatment.   
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members. Although the two reactions are related, the mechanisms behind them 
are not the same and we find that framing has a strong impact on the dynamics, as 
can be seen from the following numerical demonstration. Consider a group where 
one group member changes a purple chip into a blue one in Round 1 of Game 1. 
Using the estimates from TABLE 4, the expected numbers of blue chips the group 
has in Round 2 of Game 1 are 0.64 and 1.34 for treatments BSL and FRM, 
respectively. With framing, the number is not only twice as high, it is also above 
one. This indicates that the number of blue chips goes up on average in treatment 
FRM whereas it goes down in the baseline treatment. The same holds when the 
group has initially two blue chips: the expected numbers of blue chips in Round 2 
is 1.51 (2.55) without (with) framing and this is below (above) 2.   
6 Conclusion 
We have designed a novel dynamic game, the green transition game, which 
combines features of a coordination game with features of a public good game 
(including free-rider incentives). The game is a type of dynamic three-player stag-
hunt game, and captures some elements of a transition of a transition from an 
economy using dirty technologies to a green economy. In the game, which consists 
of multiple rounds, group members have to choose each round whether they want 
to change the color of one the three chips they have. They start with only purple 
chips. If sufficiently many chips are changed, the group transits from a benchmark 
stable Nash equilibrium (only purple chips) to an alternative state (only blue 
chips) with higher payoffs, but the transition is slow and costly. Coordination is 
required to implement the transition while minimizing costs: only when the 
majority of the group transit, does it pay off for the individual to go along. The 
transition dynamics produce a ‘valley of death’: when individuals start a transition 
to the alternative state, but are not supported by their group members, they suffer 
substantial losses and turn back. To further complicate the transition, we have 
added a free-rider problem. An individual that lags one round behind the other 
group members during the transition rounds benefits most. However, when too 
many individuals choose to delay the transition for their own gain, the 
transformation fails and losses cumulate. Most costs are allocated to those 
individuals that supported the transition, while the conservative or opportunistic 
members do not pay the price, or even gain, from their lack of support. 
To enable groups to learn to coordinate over time, the same game was 
repeated five times, using partner matching. We have run two treatments: one 
baseline treatment with neutral wording and one framing treatment, in which the 
instructions included meaningful environmental context. We find robust learning 
over the five games. In the first game coordination is very difficult, but payoffs 
increase as the number of unsuccessful transitions decreases with gained 
experience over the games. Nevertheless, only a small minority of groups in the 
baseline treatment learn to make the transition. Adding environmental context 
significantly increases the number of profitable transactions, but also in the first 
game of the framing treatment payoffs are lower than the benchmark payoffs. 
Furthermore, the environmental context seems to inhibit learning from past 
experiences, in particular across games, and the coherence of strategies is weaker 
than with neutral language. Consequently, average payoffs in both treatments are 
very similar, even though the framing condition results in twice as many green 
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technologies. Our results thus suggest some general support for ‘going green’ but 
also for more anchoring of beliefs: proponents and opponents stick more closely 
to their initial choices and seem less inclined adjust their decisions based on the 
group’s history.  
This paper reports the results of the first experiment with this new, three-
player dynamic stag-hunt game. We believe this game has some interesting 
features, and corresponds rather well to coordination problems individuals, 
teams, firms, or countries may experience in real life when considering a change 
away from the stable status quo situation to a potentially better state. Changes in 
networks with externalities (standards for appliances, fax machines, fuel 
infrastructure) provide examples of such dynamic coordination games. The game 
introduced here seems to offer a rather balanced tradeoff between costs and 
benefits, also given the fact that the groups’ performances are rather mixed. We 
think this basic framework is appealing and could be extended and tested in 
several directions. For example, one could look at different group sizes or allow 
for various forms of asymmetry, such as unequal number of chips, reflecting 
asymmetric technological capacities. Another natural extension would be to study 
the effect of (policy) instruments, which could help improve coordination in this 
game. We are currently working on experiments that examine some specific 
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Appendix A: Strategies for the infinite horizon game   
We compute the following individually rational strategies for the infinite 
horizon game. First, consider the two pure strategies that converge quickly to the 
extremes of full purple or full blue. If the group number of blue chips equals at 
least 5, all members try to get 3 blue chips as quickly as they can (strategy 1). 
Otherwise, if the number of group blue chips is less than 5, all group members 
switch to full purple (strategy 2). As the group starts with no blue chips, it is stuck 
in the all purple equilibrium, which is a stable equilibrium. Payoffs are normalized 
relative to the payoff of the equilibrium to which they converge. The table that 
specifies the strategies and payoffs is given below. 
 




chips at start 
of round 
Subject’s blue 






Total payoff at 
start of round 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
In equilibrium strategies 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out of equilibrium strategies to purple 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 -9 0 0 0 1 1 -9 
2 0 0 3 0 0 2 2 2 -18 1 1 -9 3 3 -27 
2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 -9 0 0 0 1 1 -9 
2 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 2 -18 1 1 -9 3 3 -27 
2 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 -8 -8 0 0 0 2 -8 -8 
2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 -9 0 0 0 1 1 -9 
Out of equilibrium strategies to blue 
1 0 2 3 1 3 3 -22 -2 -2 -11 -1 -1 -33 -3 -3 
1 0 3 3 1 3 3 -22 -2 -2 -11 -1 -1 -33 -3 -3 
1 1 1 3 2 2 3 -12 -12 -2 0 0 0 -12 -12 -2 
1 1 2 2 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 1 2 3 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 1 3 3 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 2 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 2 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* For each variable, columns correspond to the separate members in each group. Payoffs are 






Next we consider a more sophisticated strategy, which always converges to 
the full blue stable equilibrium (see TABLE 6). The interpretation of the strategies 
is as follows. 
 
1. If the total group number of blue chips at the start of a round is at least equal 
to 5, then for each subject payoffs are maximal when it increases its number of 
blue chips as quickly as possible. 
2. When the total number of blue chips at the start of a round equals 2, then all 
group members invest in blue and make the transition as quickly as possible. 
3. When the total number of blue chips at the start of a round is 3 or 4, and at 
most one subject has no blue chip, then each member will ensure it has 2 blue 
chips at the end of the round, or 1 if it started with none. The intuition is that 
individual payoffs are maximized when the group has at least 5 chips at the 
end of the current round = start of the next round (to secure the transition); 
but each individual prefers to have 2 blue chips at the end of the round, as the 
individual payoff with 2 blue chips exceeds or is at least equal to the individual 
payoff with 1 or 3 blue chips. The reason is that having only 1 blue chip 
increases the current round payoff by 9 units, but comparing the future payoffs 
when starting with (1,2,2,) or (2,2,2), it appears that the former state decreases 
the future payoffs by 11 units for the first subject. Thus ending the round with 
(2,2,2) is strictly preferred over (1,2,2,) for the first subject. Similarly, (2,2,2) 
is strictly preferred over (3,2,2) for the first subject. 
4. When two members have no blue chip, and the third member has 2 or 3 blue 
chips, then individual payoffs are maximized when the group has at least 5 
chips at the end of the current round = start of the next round (to secure the 
transition); so that the group has (1,1,3) at the end of the round.  
5. If the number of blue chips in the group is 0 or 1, then all subjects follow a 
symmetric mixed strategy with a probability α to have 1 blue chip at the end 
of the round, and probability (1–α) to have no blue chip at the end of the round. 
The mixed strategy details are presented in TABLE 7. For α=0.654, we find that 
the mixed strategy is rational, in the sense that the expected payoff with one 
blue chip at the end of the round is the same as the expected payoff without a 
blue chip (in both cases: E[π]=–43). If the subject has only purple chips at the 
end of the round, the individual expected payoff for that round is E[vi ]=–7.7, 
but the probability of repeating to the same state in the next round is 1–
α2=0.57; only if both other subjects choose blue will the game move out of the 
initial state. If the subject himself has one blue chip at the end of the round, 
then the individual expected payoff for that round is lower (E[vi ]=–16.7), but 
the probability of starting the transition has increased to 0.88. Finally, if the 
subject has one blue chip and the other subjects have none, it does not pay off 
for the subject to add one blue chip, as such a strategy decreases the expected 
immediate payoff by 9 units and it does not increase the next round expected 
payoff substantially – or at least not sufficiently. 
 
Note, if the mixed strategy for 0 or 1 blue chips is based on a different level of α, 
then the outcome is not an equilibrium. Consider, for example, the case that α=0.5. 
In that case, when starting without blue chips, not changing the color of a chip will 
result in an expected payoff of -57.0 (not in the table). Changing one chip to 
become blue increases the expected payoff to -49.5 (not in the table). The 
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symmetric mixed strategy for α=0.5 is thus not an equilibrium: when the other 
group members have a ‘too’ small probability to acquire a blue chip, it is always 
profitable (in expectations) to acquire a blue chip oneself. On the other hand, when 
α = 0.9 for all subjects, then the expected payoff for keeping only purple chips 
equals -33.9 (not in the table), while the expected payoff for converting a purple 
chip into a blue chip is -39.7 (not in the table). It is thus profitable to keep purple. 
If other group members have a ‘too high’ probability to transit to blue, it is 
profitable (in expectations) to lag behind. As a result, the symmetric mixed 
equilibrium strategy is stable, in the sense that deviations from some participants 
will induce compensating strategies from the other group members. 
 




chips at start 
of round 
Subject’s blue 






Total payoff at 
start of round 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
In equilibrium strategies 
5 0 0 0 Mixed –13.6 –29.4 –43 
5 0 0 1 Mixed –13.6 –29.4 –43 
2 0 1 1 1 2 2 -14 -24 -24 -11 -1 -1 -25 -25 -25 
3 1 1 1 2 2 2 -23 -23 -23 0 0 0 -23 -23 -23 
1 1 2 2 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 2 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out of equilibrium strategies 
2 0 0 2 1 1 3 -14 -14 -34 -12 -12 -2 -26 -26 -36 
4 0 0 3 1 1 3 -14 -14 -34 -12 -12 -2 -26 -26 -36 
3 0 1 2 1 2 2 -14 -24 -24 -11 -1 -1 -25 -25 -25 
3 0 1 3 1 2 2 -14 -24 -24 -11 -1 -1 -25 -25 -25 
3 0 2 2 1 2 2 -14 -24 -24 -11 -1 -1 -25 -25 -25 
1 0 2 3 1 3 3 -22 -2 -2 -11 -1 -1 -33 -3 -3 
1 0 3 3 1 3 3 -22 -2 -2 -11 -1 -1 -33 -3 -3 
3 1 1 2 2 2 2 -23 -23 -23 0 0 0 -23 -23 -23 
1 1 1 3 2 2 3 -12 -12 -2 0 0 0 -12 -12 -2 
1 1 2 3 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 1 3 3 2 3 3 -11 -1 -1 0 0 0 -11 -1 -1 
1 2 2 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* For each variable, columns correspond to the separate members in each group. Payoffs are 





TABLE 7. Mixed Strategy 5, details* 
Subject’s blue 
chips at end of 
round 
Immediate 
payoff, subject 1 
Next round 
payoff, subject 1 
Total payoff at 
start of round, 
subject 1 
1 2 3   
probability, 
α=0.654 
Strategy subject 1: full purple 
   –7.7 –35.3 –43.0 
0 0 0 -9 E[π] =–43.0 (1–α)2=0.120 
0 0 1 -8 E[π] =–43.0 α (1–α)=0.226 
0 1 0 -8 E[π] =–43.0 α (1–α)=0.226 
0 1 1 -7 -25 α2=0.428 
Strategy subject 1: one blue 
   –16.7 –26.3 –43.0 
1 0 0 -18 E[π] =–43.0 (1–α)2=0.120 
1 0 1 -17 -25 α (1–α)=0.226 
1 1 0 -17 -25 α (1–α)=0.226 
1 1 1 -16 -23 α2=0.428 
Strategy subject 1: two blue 
   –25.7 –25.5 –51.2 
2 0 0 -27 -36 (1–α)2=0.120 
2 0 1 -26 -25 α (1–α)=0.226 
2 1 0 -26 -25 α (1–α)=0.226 
2 1 1 -25 -23 α2=0.428 







Appendix B: Instructions  
 
Baseline treatment 
    
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these 
instructions carefully, as you can earn a considerable amount of money.   
During the experiment, amounts will be denoted by tokens. Tokens are 
converted to Euros at the following exchange rate: 1 token = € 0.05, so 100 tokens 
= € 5.00. At the end of this experiment you will be paid your earnings from the 
experiment. 
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We will 
answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow this rule. 
Otherwise we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
 
Detailed information on the experiment  
The experiment consists of five games of 7 rounds each, in which you will 
interact with two other participants. The three of you form a group that will 
remain the same in all 7 rounds and in all games. You will never know the identity 
of the other participants in your group. The group composition is secret for every 
participant. Interaction only takes place via the computer. 
    
What you have to do  
At the beginning of a game, in round 1, you as well as your group members 
receive 3 purple chips and 0 blue chips each. In each round you have to make one 
decision on changing chips.  
Before you decide on the chips, the pay-off scheme for that round is 
determined. There are two pay-off schemes, called pay-off schemes PURPLE and 
BLUE. In pay-off scheme PURPLE, each purple chip you have at the end of the 
round yields 10 tokens whereas in pay-off scheme BLUE each blue chip you have 
at the end of the round yields 10 tokens. On top of that, and irrespective of the 
payoff scheme, each blue chip your group has at the end of the round yields 1 token 
to each of the group members. 
Which scheme is implemented for your group in a round is determined by the 
majority of chips your group has at the beginning of the round. That is, if your 
group has more purple chips than blue chips at the beginning of the round, pay-
off scheme PURPLE will be implemented; if your group has more blue chips than 
purple chips at the beginning of the round, pay-off scheme BLUE will be 
implemented. 
Regarding the decision on changing chips you have to choose whether you 
want to change one purple chip into one blue chip, whether you want to change 
one blue chip into one purple chip, or whether you want to make no change. Note 
that you are not allowed to have a negative number of chips of a particular colour, 
so in order to be able to change a chip you need to have at least one chip of that 
colour. 
  
How you make your decisions and interact with your group members in 
each round  




1. Information about chips and pay-off scheme.  
You are informed about the number of purple and blue chips you have and 
about the number of purple and blue chips your group has. You are also 
informed about the two pay-off schemes: 
o Pay-off scheme PURPLE: Each purple chip you have in Stage 3 yields 10 
tokens.  
o Pay-off scheme BLUE: Each blue chip you have in Stage 3 yields 10 tokens.  
Which scheme is implemented for your group is determined by the 
majority of chips your group has.  
Recall that in addition to the scheme that is implemented, each blue chip 
your group has in Stage 3 yields 1 token to each group member. 
 
2. Decision on changing chips. 
You have to indicate whether or not you want to change one of your chips. 
That is, you have to decide between: 
o no change 
o change one purple chip into one blue chip 
o change one blue chip into one purple chip 
Note that depending on the number of purple and blue chips you have, not 
all options may be possible in a particular round.  
 
3. Resulting pay-offs. 
You are informed about the number of purple and blue chips you have 
(after the change) and about the number of purple and blue chips your group 
has (after the change).  
 
You are also informed about the earnings resulting from your chips and the 
pay-off scheme, the earnings resulting from the blue chips your group has, and 
your total earnings for the round. 
 
The experiment then continues with the next round of the game, or if it was 
the last round of a game, with the first round of a new game.  
 
The information you receive   
During each round, you see the information of all previous stages of that 
round. 
After the last round of a game, you will receive information about your total 
earnings in that game. 
 
Final earnings   
At the end of the experiment you are informed about your earnings in all five 
games. One of the five games will be randomly selected by the computer to be paid. 
You are informed about your earnings in the game that is selected for payment.  
 
Possible change after Game 2  
After Game 2 is finished, the game may be changed slightly. You will be 
informed about this on your screen. After this brief interruption, the experiment 
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You get a couple of minutes to look at the instructions. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. Please remain seated quietly until the 
experiment starts. 
When the experiment is finished, also please remain seated quietly. We will 











Framing treatment  
    
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these 
instructions carefully, as you can earn a considerable amount of money.   
During the experiment, amounts will be denoted by tokens. Tokens are 
converted to Euros at the following exchange rate: 1 token = € 0.05, so 100 tokens 
= € 5.00. At the end of this experiment you will be paid your earnings from the 
experiment. 
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment. If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. We will 
answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow this rule. 
Otherwise we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
 
Detailed information on the experiment  
The experiment consists of five games of 7 rounds each, in which you will 
interact with two other participants. The three of you form a group that will 
remain the same in all 7 rounds and in all games. You will never know the identity 
of the other participants in your group. The group composition is secret for every 
participant. Interaction only takes place via the computer. 
 
What you have to do  
At the beginning of a game, in round 1, you as well as your group members 
receive 3 brown chips and 0 green chips each. In each round you have to make one 
decision on changing chips. The brown chips represent dirty technologies that use 
exhaustible resources like fossil fuels and that contribute to climate change. The 
green chips represent clean technologies, using renewable resources like solar 
and wind energy. In the game you play, you invest in fossil fuels or in renewable 
energy by deciding on the chips. 
We assume that there is a supporting infrastructure that can facilitate only one 
technology at a time. The infrastructure is determined by the dominant 
technology, that is, the majority of chips in your group at the start of the round. A 
BROWN infrastructure means brown technologies make profits: each brown chip 
you have at the end of the round yields 10 tokens. A GREEN infrastructure means 
green technologies make profits: each green chip you have at the end of the round 
yields 10 tokens. 
In addition to the payoffs that are determined by the dominant technology, we 
subsidize green chips. Each green chip your group has at the end of the round 
yields 1 token to each of the group members (irrespective of the infrastructure). 
Which infrastructure is implemented for your group in a round is determined 
by the majority of chips your group has at the beginning of the round. That is, if 
your group has more brown chips than green chips at the beginning of the round, 
infrastructure BROWN will be implemented; if your group has more green chips 
than brown chips at the beginning of the round, infrastructure GREEN will be 
implemented. 
Regarding the decision on changing chips you have to choose whether you 
want to change one brown chip into one green chip, whether you want to change 
one green chip into one brown chip, or whether you want to make no change. Note 
that you are not allowed to have a negative number of chips of a particular colour, 
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so in order to be able to change a chip you need to have at least one chip of that 
colour. 
 
How you make your decisions and interact with your group members in 
each round  
Each round consists of the following three stages:  
 
1. Information about chips and infrastructure.  
You are informed about the number of brown and green chips you have 
and about the number of brown and green chips your group has. You are also 
informed about the two infrastructures: 
o BROWN infrastructure: Each brown chip you have in Stage 3 yields 10 
tokens.  
o GREEN infrastructure: Each green chip you have in Stage 3 yields 10 
tokens. 
Which infrastructure is implemented for your group is determined by the 
majority of chips your group has.  
Recall that in addition to the infrastructure that is implemented, we 
subsidize green investments, and therefore each green chip your group has in 
Stage 3 yields 1 token to each group member. 
 
2. Decision on changing chips. 
You have to indicate whether or not you want to change one of your chips. 
That is, you have to decide between: 
o no change 
o change one brown chip into one green chip 
o change one green chip into one brown chip 
Note that depending on the number of brown and green chips you have, 
not all options may be possible in a particular round.  
 
3. Resulting pay-offs. 
You are informed about the number of brown and green chips you have 
(after the change) and about the number of brown and green chips your group 
has (after the change).  
You are also informed about the earnings resulting from your chips and 
the infrastructure, the earnings resulting from the green chips your group has, 
and your total earnings for the round. 
 
The experiment then continues with the next round of the game, or if it was 
the last round of a game, with the first round of a new game. 
 
The information you receive   
During each round, you see the information of all previous stages of that 
round. After the last round of a game, you will receive information about your total 





Final earnings   
At the end of the experiment you are informed about your earnings in all five 
games. One of the five games will be randomly selected by the computer to be paid. 
You are informed about your earnings in the game that is selected for payment.  
 
Possible change after Game 2  
After Game 2 is finished, the game may be changed slightly. You will be 
informed about this on your screen. After this brief interruption, the experiment 
will continue with Game 3. In all games you will be in a group with the same 
participants.  
 
You get a couple of minutes to look at the instructions. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. Please remain seated quietly until the 
experiment starts. 
When the experiment is finished, also please remain seated quietly. We will 





Appendix C: Extra figures (group level)  
 
FIGURE 3. Blue chips over games and rounds, per group, treatment BSL 
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